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Abstract 
 
A growing body of literature suggests that office-motivated politicians manipulate fiscal 
policy instruments in order to enhance their re-election prospects. This paper directly 
H[DPLQHVWKHLPSDFWRIILVFDOSROLF\RQLQFXPEHQWV¶UH-election prospects by focusing on the 
impact of public investment. This impact is estimated using a panel of 20 OECD countries 
over the period 1972-1999. We find that the level of public investment in the earlier years of 
an incumbent's term in office improves their re-election prospects, whereas election year 
manipulation of public investment is neither rewarded nor punished. Our evidence also 
suggests that, after controlling for the level of deficit and public investment, the level of 
government revenue both in the election and non-election years does not seem to affect re-
election prospects. Moreover, we find that deficit creation during elections and in non-
election years are not rewarded by voters. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the seminal work of Nordhaus (1975), a rich body of literature suggests that office-
motivated incumbents manipulate fiscal policy in order to improve their chances to get re-
elected.1 In a rational expectations framework, political budget cycles (PBC) still arise under 
the driving assumption of temporary information asymmetries between voters and politicians 
regarding the competence level of the latter.2 Electoral manipulation of fiscal policy can also 
affect the composition rather than the level of public spending. Rogoff (1990) provided a firm 
theoretical foundation showing that electorally motivated incumbents signal their competence 
by shifting public spending toward more visible government consumption and away from 
public investment goods that are mostly long-WHUPSURMHFWVDQGZLOO LQFUHDVHYRWHUV¶XWility 
upon completion.  
Many empirical studies find evidence of electorally timed shifts in the composition of 
public spending not only at the national but also at the local level. It is important to note, 
though, that for studies conducted at the local level, evidence suggests that authorities attempt 
to signal their competence by expanding the level of investment spending (see, e.g., Khemani 
(2004); Drazen and Eslava (2010)) while policymakers at the national level provide 
immediate benefit to voters through consumption or taxation whereas capital spending 
decreases (see, e.g., Vergne (2009); Katsimi and Sarantides (2012)). These findings may 
UHIOHFW WKDW 5RJRII¶V  DVVXPSWLRQ RI ORZHU YLVLELOLW\ RI FDSLWDO H[SHQGLWXUHV HJ
infrastructure) conforms much better to central government rather than to local level 
spending. 
In fact, manipulation of the composition of fiscal policy seems particularly relevant in 
developed economies in which the incumbent may avoid deficit creation due to the fear of 
voters¶GLVIDYRXU,QGHHG%UHQGHUDQG'UD]HQILQG that election years are associated 
with larger expenditure composition changes in established democracies, the majority of 
which are developed economies, while incumbents LQµQHZGHPRFUDFLHV¶WHQG to increase the 
overall level of expenditures in election years (see Brender and Drazen (2005)).  
                                                 
1
 In contrast, the partisan approach focuses on the role of government ideology on fiscal policy priorities (see, e.g., Hibbs 
(1977); Alesina (1987); Chappell and Keech (1988)). For empirical evaluations of the impact of ideology on the composition 
of fiscal policy, see, among others, Potrafke (2011). 
2
 For a discussion of the implications of theoretical PBC adverse selection and moral hazard type models, see Shi and 
Svensson (2003). Empirical evidence on the budgetary impact of elections, until recently, suggested that PBC was a 
phenomenon of less-developed countries (see, e.g., Schuknecht (1996); Shi and Svensson (2006)) or of the so-FDOOHGµQHZ
GHPRFUDFLHV¶ VHH %UHQGHU DQG 'UD]HQ  5HFHQW VWXGLHV IRU GHYHORSHG FRXQWULHV SURYLGH PL[HG HYLGHQce both in 
favour of (see Efthyvoulou (2012) for a sample of 27 EU member states) and against (see Klomp and de Haan (2013)) the 
existence of PBCs.  
 3 
A complementary literature investigates the impact of fiscal policy choices on the 
YRWLQJEHKDYLRXUDQGRQLQFXPEHQWV¶UH-election prospects. Empirical studies that attempt to 
assess the impact of fiscal policy on re-election prospects either include fiscal variables in the 
estimation of a voting function or they employ binary models in order to estimate the 
probability of an incumbent's re-election.  
The first approach belongs to the literature on economic voting based on the seminal 
papers of Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), Mueller (1970) and Kramer (1971). This literature 
estimates popularity/voting functions in order to investigate the impact of economic variables 
RQ YRWLQJ EHKDYLRXU %DVHG RQ WKH ³5HVSRQVLELOLW\ +\SRWKHVLV DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKLFK YRWHUV
hold the government responsible for the economy, an extensive literature investigates the 
channels through which voting behaviour depends on voters' economic experiences and on 
their perception and evaluation of the macro economy. However, most multi-country studies 
WKDW HVWLPDWH WKH LPSDFW RI WKH HFRQRP\ RQ WKH LQFXPEHQWV¶ VKDUH RI WKH YRWHV DW QDWLRQDO
elections measure economic performance in terms of output growth, inflation and 
unemployment without taking into account government's fiscal performance (for a survey see 
Paldam (1981); Norpoth et al. (1991); Nannestad and Paldam (1994); Lewis-Beck and 
Paldam (2000)). An exception is Veiga (2013) who finds that voters reward positive budget 
balances whereas after the 2008 crisis there is evidence that they have become more 
determinedly fiscally conservative.  
The second approach of estimating a binary model has been used by the majority of 
WKHOLPLWHGQXPEHURIHPSLULFDOVWXGLHVRQWKHLPSDFWRIILVFDOSROLF\RQWKHLQFXPEHQW¶VUH-
election prospects at national level.3 Their findings suggest that in established democracies, 
well-informed voters act as fiscal conservatives and punish rather than reward loose fiscal 
policies at the polls (see, e.g., Brender and Drazen (2008) and Alesina et al. (2012)).4 
For elections at the state and local levels researchers have estimated both binary 
models and voting functions. The dominant result that voters penalize expansive fiscal 
policies (see, among others, Peltzman (1992); Brender (2003)) has recently been challenged 
for some developing countries (see, e.g., Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004); Sakurai and 
Menezes-Filho (2008); Jones et al. (2012)). Regarding the relationship between public 
investment expenditures and re-election prospects, limited studies using both approaches are 
                                                 
3
 Although they do not directly test the impact of fiscal policy on re-election, Klomp and de Haan (2013) find that election-
motivated budget cycles have a significant positive (but fairly small) effect on the electoral support for the political parties in 
government.  
4
 It should be noted that, under certain assumptions regarding preferences and the nature of uncertainty, a number of 
theoretical models can support the opposite result, namely that electoral manipulation of fiscal policy increases re-election 
probability (see Rogoff (1990); Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994); Hodler et al. (2010)).  
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exclusively concentrated at the local level and their results are mixed (see, e.g., Veiga and 
Veiga (2007) and Drazen and Eslava (2010)).  
 Two points should be noted about these contradicting results at the local level. First, 
as emphasized by Brender and Drazen (2008), empirical conclusions drawn from country 
studies should, strictly speaking, be limited to these countries. Given that fiscal items that are 
clearly identifiable as provincial government responsibilities differ from one country to 
another, it is difficult to derive more general policy conclusions from country studies. 
Secondly, as already mentioned, local authorities tend to expand expenditures on investment 
SURMHFWVQHDUHOHFWLRQVLQGLFDWLQJWKDW5RJRII¶VSUHGLFWLRQRIVKLIWVLQSXEOLFVSHQGLQJ
toward more visible government consumption and away from public investment goods may 
not hold for local governments in which public investment may not be characterized by low 
visibility. 
The contribution of the present paper is found in its focus on the role of national 
public investment as an instrument for affecting re-election prospects of the incumbent in 
developed countries. We believe that this is an important step because we empirically test the 
following predictions implicitly derived from the existing literature: Firstly, if public capital 
spending is invisible, as suggested by Rogoff (1990), then the manipulation of public 
investment just before elections should not affect the re-election prospects of the incumbent. 
We analyze the impact of public investment on voting behaviour and re-election probability 
by using a sample of established democracies, because we believe it makes sense to look at 
the countries in which this type of electoral manipulation has been supported by empirical 
evidence (see Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) and Brender and Drazen (2013)). Our paper 
complements this literature by testing whether electoral manipulation in the form of a fall in 
public investment in developed established democracies found by Katsimi and Sarantides 
 DIIHFWV WKH LQFXPEHQWV¶ UH-election prospects.5 Secondly, public investment 
expenditures that occurred LQ WKH HDUOLHU \HDUV RI DQ LQFXPEHQW¶V WHUP LQ RIILFH VKRXOG EH
observable by voters near the completion of the term, since these expenditures are mostly 
long-term projects which are noticed with a lag. Given the positive impact of productive 
expenditure on long-run growth emphasized by the relevant literature, we expect voters to 
                                                 
5
 Brender and Drazen (2013) also find evidence for electoral manipulation in public spending in the same group of countries 
but their decomposition does not include capital spending. In their paper ³FRPSRVLWLRQ´UHIHUVWRWKHIXQFWLRQDOFODVVLILFDWLRQ
of public spending that distinguishes transactions by policy purpose or type of outlay (e.g., healthcare expenditures). 
Throughout this paper, though, we use the economic classification that divides public spending into capital and current 
expenditures, and WKH WHUP ³composition´ LV XVHG WR UHIHU VSHFLILFDOO\ DQG RQO\ to the percentage of capital to current 
expenditures.  
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reward a rise in this type of expenditure.6 For a given level of deficit, voters are likely to 
reward this type of expenditure if they perceive it as more 'productive' than current 
expenditure.  
We test the impact of public investment on re-election prospects by estimating both a 
binary model and a voting function. Our empirical results using a sample of 20 OECD 
countries over the period of 1972-1999 suggest that the level of public investment in the 
earlier years of an incumbent's term in office improves re-election prospects whereas election 
year manipulation of public investment is neither rewarded nor punished.7 Given that public 
investment expenditures at the national level are mostly long-term projects, this result is 
FRQVLVWHQWZLWK5RJRII¶VDVVXPSWLRQRIWhe lower visibility of this type of expenditure 
and explains previous empirical findings for electoral manipulation of public investment.  
Our paper builds on the existing literature on the effect of fiscal policy on electoral 
results at the national level. Brender and Drazen (2008) study a sample of 77 countries over 
the period 1960-2003 and find that deficits in an election year are punished by voters in 
developed countries that are established democracies. Alesina et al. (2012) analyse a sample 
of 19 OECD countries for the 1975-2008 period and find no evidence that fiscal adjustments 
increase the turnover of governments. Veiga (2013) uses a voting function for a panel of 15 
European Union countries for the 1970-2011 period in order to analyze the impact of the 
(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQSURFHVVRQYRWHUV¶HYDOXDWLRQVRIJRYHUQPHQWV¶HFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFH
and finds that the vote share of the government depends positively on budget surpluses.  
However, although our paper also examines the impact of deficit creation on re-
election prospects, its main focus on the impact of public investment and the composition of 
public spending is novel. Moreover, it investigates whether the main predictions of the 
existing literature regarding the political cost of electoral deficit creation can be found after 
controlling for other elements of the government's budget constraint such as revenue and 
expenditure composition. We find that, similar to Brender and Drazen (2008), deficit creation 
both in the election year and during the term in office is never rewarded by voters in 
developed countries (it is either punished or it does not affect the re-election prospects). We 
also find some evidence that the vote share of the main government party increases with the 
level of budget surplus in the election period which is a result consistent with the findings of 
Veiga (2013). Our results are not directly comparable to Alesina et al. (2012) who use a 
                                                 
6
  Paul et al. (2004) and Henderson and Kumbhakar (2006) emphasize the positive impact of public capital on productivity 
whereas  Kneller et al. (1999) and Bleaney et al. (2001) find a positive effect of productive expenditures on long-run growth. 
7
 In section 2.1 we discuss the reasons for limiting our sample to the years 1972-1999. 
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different specification and focus mainly on large fiscal adjustments but their finding that 
fiscal adjustments are not punished by voters is consistent with our results. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, 
specifies the econometric model, and contains our basic findings. Section 3 reports the results 
of robustness tests. In section 4 we test whether our results are replicated by estimating a 
voting function. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Analysis 
2.1. Data and estimation method 
In order to estimate the effect of public investment expenditure and the composition of public 
expenditure on re-election prospects, we use data for 20 OECD countries over the period of 
1972-1999.8 Our sample consists of countries that can be characterised as developed 
economies and established democracies, since the existing literature indicates that 
manipulation of the composition of fiscal policy seems particularly relevant in countries with 
these characteristics.9 The countries in our sample are also included in the sample used by 
Brender and Drazen (2008), Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) and Brender and Drazen (2013) 
allowing us to relate our results with the findings of these papers. In line with Brender and 
Drazen (2008), we estimate the impact of fiscal policy on the incumbent's probability of re-
election in a binary model although in a later section we test the robustness of our results by 
estimating a voting function. The dependent variable re-election is based on information from 
the World Statesmen Encyclopedia and from the Inter-Parliamentary Union database. These 
data allow us to follow the terms of individual leaders and parties in office from appointment 
to termination and to associate them with election dates. It is worth noting that we only 
include legislative elections for countries with parliamentary political systems and 
presidential elections for countries with presidential systems. In line with Brender and Drazen 
(2008), the re-election variable includes observations in which the leader (the president for 
the United States and the prime minister for all other countries of our sample) has been in 
                                                 
8
 A key variable for our empirical analysis is not available after 1999, as discussed in the following. 
9
 The countries of our sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Iceland is excluded from our sample because as a small and isolated country it lacks some characteristics that may 
distinguish voting behaviour between national and local elections such as the low 'visibility' of national public investment.  
As noted earlier, the differences in the electoral manipulation of public investment between local and national elections 
found in the literature may reflect that in the local level public investment is considered a 'visible' component of public 
expenditure. Due to the small size of our sample, we keep Luxemburg but it is worth noting that when it is dropped our 
results remain similar. Finally, South Korea and New Zealand are also excluded from the our sample because in the first 
country the president cannot run for re-election in the two elections periods we consider (1992 and 1997), while there is no 
availability of fiscal data for the second country. 
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office for at least two years prior to the elections. It takes value 1 if the incumbent chief 
executive is re-elected and 0 otherwise. It also allows for the following special cases: 
(i) In cases in which the leader quits within the year of the election, re-election receives 
the value 0. 
(ii) In cases in which, during the election year, a leader is replaced because she/he died or 
resigned due to health problems, re-election takes the value 1 if the successor leader gets re-
elected and 0 otherwise. 
(iii)  For the United States, where the president is subject to a legal limit, re-election 
UHFHLYHVWKHYDOXHLIWKHUHLJQLQJOHDGHU¶VSDUW\ZLQVWKHHOHFWLRQDQGLILWORVHV10  
(iv)  Finally, in a coalition government, the re-election variable takes the value 1 if the 
appointed prime minister comes from the same party as that of the prime minister before the 
elections, and 0 otherwise. In addition, to ensure that the prime minister has not been changed 
because he became unpopular, we consider re-election only in the case in which the party of 
the appointed prime minister of the governing coalition received in the current elections a 
higher vote share in comparison to the previous elections. Overall we have 106 campaigns in 
which the leader was re-elected in 58 cases.11  
Regarding our main variables of interest, ZH REWDLQ RXU ILVFDO GDWD IURP WKH µGlobal 
Development Network Growth Database¶ (GDNGD), whose primary source is the IMF 
"Government Finance Statistics" (GFS) database. It should be noted that GFS is the only 
multi-country data source for disaggregated central government data. For this reason, it is the 
standard database used in empirical research studying either aggregate fiscal variables (see, 
e.g., Brender and Drazen (2008)) or the composition of fiscal policy instruments (see 
Schuknecht (2000); Vergne (2009)).12  
Unfortunately, we cannot expand our dataset beyond the 1972-1999 period since GFS 
modified the methodology of calculating the fiscal variables. In fact GFS until the late 
nineties has been calculated using Government Finance Statistics Manual 1986 (GFSM 
                                                 
10
 In our sample, in the US elections of 1988, the candidate could not run for re-election after the termination of the second 
mandate. Besley and Case (1995) show that the candidate who cannot run for re-election behaves differently regarding the 
manipulation of public expenditures. In contrast, though, it can be said that some party loyalty can justify the maintenance of 
public budget manipulation. To confirm that the results are robust, when we drop this observation our results remain 
unaffected.  
11
 Although we follow the OHDGHU¶VUH-election, in order to lengthen our sample, we follow the SDUW\¶VUH-election for special 
cases (ii), (iii), and (iv). However, when we narrow the sample in order to follow leader's re-election in all cases, our results 
remain unaffected. 
12
 We use central government data for several important reasons: Firstly given that general government data include all 
levels of government (state, local, central), results based on such data would be more difficult to interpret. As noted by 
Schuknecht (2000), the government only controls directly the central government budget, while changes in public spending 
of the general government may be affected by both general and local elections. Secondly, data from general government 
accounts are less consistent across countries and time periods. 
 8 
1986) classification, while data beyond this point have been calculated according to the 
Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 (GFSM 2001). The new GFSM 2001 
classification provides observations for the years 1990-2011, but not for our main variable of 
interest, namely public investment expenditures. This means that we can neither estimate our 
equations for two separate samples (1972-1999) and (1990-2011), nor harmonize the data 
streams for both classifications and re-run regressions from 1972 to 2011. 
We analyze the impact of public investment on re-election prospects, by estimating two 
different specifications:  
In the first one we are interested in the impact of the overall capital spending of the 
incumbent during her term in office. Therefore, we include on the right hand side of our 
specification a variable capital term defined as the average of capital expenditures during the 
OHDGHU¶V FXUUent term in office, scaled by GDP and expressed as percentage. Likewise, in 
order to investigate the impact of composition of expenditures on re-election prospects, we 
construct a variable composition term defined as the percentage of capital to current 
expenditures during the term in office of the incumbent.13 Both variables cover the whole 
SHULRGRIOHDGHU¶VFXUUHQWWHUPLQWKHRIILFHstarting with the year after the previous election 
and including the election year of current elections.14  
In the second specification we investigate the central question of our paper, which is 
whether the pre-electoral deviation of capital expenditures affects re-election prospects (see 
also Veiga and Veiga (2007); Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008)). Similar to the first 
specification, we are interested in public investment as well as the composition of public 
spending. Regarding public investment, we split the variable capital term into capital 
deviation and capital non-election. The former reflects the change in capital/GDP percentage 
in the election year relative to the average of the previous years since the last election. The 
latter is the average of capital/GDP percentage starting with the year after the previous 
election and excluding the election year of current elections. Moreover, in direct analogy to 
the first specification, we focus on the ratio of capital/current spending and we split 
composition term into composition deviation and composition non-election. 
Following Kneller et al. (1999) and Drazen and Eslava (2010), our empirical method is 
based on a full specification of the government budget constraint. Kneller et al. (1999, pp 
174-5) show that incomplete specification of the budget constraint results in substantial 
                                                 
13
 According to the descriptive statistics in the Appendix A, the average of our sample for the variable composition term is 
8.183. This means that capital spending is on average 8.183% of the current expenditure. 
14
 However, in a few cases where the leader was replaced during the term, we follow the term of the new successor as long 
as he/she stayed in office for at least two years.  
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biases in parameter estimates. To address this problem, we want to include in our empirical 
analysis all elements of the budget constraint but one in order to avoid perfect multi-
collinearity. Therefore we add in our specification the following fiscal variables: i) the central 
governmenW¶V EXGJHW VXUSOXVGHILFLW ZKLFK DFFRUGLQJ WR %UHQGHU DQG 'UD]HQ  LV
positively/negatively related to re-election prospects in developed economies and ii) the 
FHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VWRWDOUHYHQXHV15 In accordance to the definition of variables capital and 
composition ZH FRQVWUXFW IRU FHQWUDO JRYHUQPHQW¶V EXGJHW VXUSOXVGHILFLW WKH YDULDEOHV
surplus term, surplus deviation and surplus non-election. Similarly for total revenues we 
construct the variables revenues term, revenues deviation, and revenues non-election. Fiscal 
variables surplus and revenues are scaled to GDP and expressed as percentages.  
Apart from the fiscal variables, we include in our estimations the following political and 
socio-economic control variables that we expect to affect re-election prospects:  
(i) Macroeconomic conditions: We control for a number of macroeconomic variables 
that, according to the relevant literature, are expected to affect voting behaviour (see, e.g., 
Peltzman (1992); Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), Brender and Drazen (2008); Aidt et al. 
(2011) and Alesina et al. (2012)). These are the average growth rate of output (growth term), 
the average inflation rate (inflation term), and the average unemployment rate (unemployment 
term) during the term in office. Our data for growth term and inflation term are taken from 
the World Bank's World Development Indicators, while those for unemployment term are 
from the OECD Labour Force Statistics.16 
(ii) New democracy effect: Based on the approach of Brender and Drazen (2005), we 
FRQVLGHU DV HOHFWLRQV KHOG LQ D µQHZ GHPRFUDF\¶ WKH ILUVW IRXU HOHFWLRQV DIWHU D VKLIW WR D
democratic regime, indicated by the first year of a string of uninterrupted positive polity 
values as obtained from the POLITY IV annual time series. We expect that in 'new 
democracies', the first period after the transition to a democratic regime may be characterized 
by underdeveloped democratic institutions that may lead to an incumbency advantage (e.g., 
limited media independence).17  
                                                 
15
 In order to avoid perfect multi-collinearity, we omit current expenditures from our specification but our results remain the 
same if we omit revenues instead. Regarding the interpretation of the results, the estimated coefficient on the fiscal variable 
measures the marginal impact of this variable on re-election prospects, net of the marginal impact of the fiscal variable that 
we exclude from the specification and is assumed to be the financing element. This implies that current expenditures are the 
financing element in columns (1) and (2) and total expenditures in columns (3) and (4). 
16
 It is worth noting that the macroeconomic variables do not seem to display problematic correlations. In addition, when the 
variable growth term, which does not affect re-election prospects, is dropped from the specification, the results remain 
unaffected. 
17
 We included Greece, Portugal, and Spain in our sample, because we did not want to reduce its already small size. 
However, when we drop these countries from our estimations, our qualitative results remain unaffected. 
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(iii)  /HYHO RI ³YRWHU DZDUHQHVV´: A large body of theoretical literature agrees that 
electoral accountability depends positively on the level and the quality of the information 
available to voters (Persson and Tabellini (2000); Besley and Prat (2006); Pande (2011)).  
Several recent empirical studies use the educational background of the population as a proxy 
IRU³YRWHUDZDUHQHVV´PHDQLQJthe ability of electorate to process available information that 
comes with education (see, among others, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004); Aidt et al. 
(2011)). We expect that tKLV DELOLW\ PD\ KDYH DQ LPSDFW RQ YRWHUV¶ HYDOXDWLRQ RI
government's policies thereby affecting the incumbent's re-election prospects. We proxy 
³YRWHUDZDUHQHVV´ZLWKWKHLOOLWHUDFy rate among the population aged 15 years old and above 
obtained by Barro and Lee (2010).   
(iv)   Cabinet characteristics: In order to check whether cabinet ideology actually matters 
for re-election, we create the dummy variable left (right) that receives the value 1 if the share 
of seats in the cabinet for left (right) wing parties is larger than 66.6 percent. Moreover, we 
create the dummy variable centre that takes the value 1 if the share of seats in the cabinet for 
centrist parties is higher than 50%, or if we have right-centre or left-centre complexion where 
the centre party holds more than 33.3 percent of the seats. Additionally, we create the dummy 
variable fragmentation that takes the value 1 when left and right parties form a government 
that is not dominated by one side or the other.18 Finally, we create the dummy variable 
coalition that takes the value of 1 if the cabinet includes ministers from more than one party 
and 0 otherwise. Data for the type of government and on cabinet composition are taken from 
Armingneon et al. (2008). We expect that coalition governments, irrespective of ideological 
orientation or fragmentation, are more likely to face internal issues that can adversely affect 
the re-election prospects of the chief executive in power. 
(v) European Union effect: Finally, we include in our estimations the dummy variable 
EU that receives the value 1 for the period 1993-1999 for countries that are European Union 
members and signed the Maastricht treaty. For Austria, Finland, and Sweden that become 
members of the European Union on January 1, 1995, it takes the value of 1 for the period 
1995-1999. Note that the period after the adjustment of ERM bands and before the 
establishment of the Euro-DUHD ZDV FKDUDFWHUL]HG E\ (8 PHPEHU VWDWHV¶ HIIRUWV WR FRPSO\
with the convergence criteria. This effort included a process for extensive structural reforms 
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 In addition, we have also borrowed from Keefer (2012) variable govfrac and from Henisz (2000) variable h_polcon3 to 
control for party and legislative fragmentation, respectively. Both variables were found insignificantly related to re-election 
prospects and therefore, they are not included in the specification 
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DQGILVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ7KXVWKLVYDULDEOHPD\FDSWXUHWKHLPSDFWRIWKHFRXQWULHV¶HIIorts 
WRDGRSWWKH(XURRQWKHLQFXPEHQW¶VUH-election prospects. 
 A complete list of all variables used in our estimations with details on data sources and 
descriptive statistics is provided in Appendix A. Moreover, Appendix B depicts a correlation 
matrix for the right-hand-side variables of our main specification in Table 1. It is worth 
noting that in general our fiscal variables are not very highly correlated.  
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that we have attempted to include in our model a 
series of other control variables, such as the percentage of votes the incumbent received in the 
previous election, dummies to control for majoritarian vs. proportional systems, and 
presidential vs. parliamentary governments as well the number of terms the incumbent chief 
executive has been in office. However, none of these variables had a significant effect on re-
election prospects, and in order to preserve degrees of freedom, we do not include them in 
our estimations.19  
Given that our dependent variable is binary, we have to apply a non-linear estimator to 
model the determinants of re-election. We prefer the logit rather than the probit estimator 
because it allows us to obtain consistent estimates through a fixed effects-like approach as 
implemented by Chamberlain (1980). Before proceeding to the estimations, we compare the 
pooled logit estimator, the panel random effects logit estimator and the conditional (fixed 
effects) logit estimator in the following ways: First, we apply a likelihood ratio test to 
compare the random effects estimator with the pooled logit. According to the results, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. 
Second, we compare the conditional with the pooled logit estimator using a Hausman test. 
The test statistic resulted in very small or negative values. Small values support the pooled 
estimator, whereas negative values indicate that the sample size is insufficient to test the 
hypothesis. Finally, it is worth noting that in our panel the number of cross-sections exceeds 
the number of time units, which implies the pooled logit model is more efficient, since it 
requires fewer parameters to be estimated in comparison with a random effects or a fixed 
effects model.20 Therefore, we have decided to use the pooled logit as our basic specification, 
where standard errors are robust to both heteroskedasticity and possible autocorrelation 
                                                 
19
 Note that including these additional control variables in our specification does not change our basic findings. Results are 
available upon request. 
20
 We have also attempted to include GDP per capita in our specification in order to capture possible heterogeneity between 
countries. For example, a government's re-election probability may depend on the financial wealth of the country. GDP per 
capita turns out to be insignificantly related to re-election prospects and we decided to exclude it from the specification. We 
do, however, test the robustness of our results in the presence of country heterogeneity by including fixed effects in section 
3.2. 
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within countries.21 In order to test the robustness of our results to the presence of fixed effects 
capturing heterogeneity across countries, in section 3 we re-estimate our baseline regressions 
using the conditional (fixed-effects) logit estimator. 
 
2.2. Results 
In Table 1, we examine the effect of capital expenditures and the composition of public 
expenditures on the probability of re-election. Regarding the macroeconomic variables, we 
observe that the variable growth term is insignificantly related to re-election prospects in all 
regressions, while the variable inflation term produces results that indicate a robust negative 
effect on the probability of re-election. These results seem to verify the previous studies of 
Alesina et al. (1998) and Brender and Drazen (2008), who found that voters dislike inflation 
while the growth rate does not seem to affect re-election prospects. In general, studies for 
developed countries are contradictory regarding the effect of the growth rate of output on 
voting behaviour (see, e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal (1995)). As far as the variable 
unemployment term is concerned, it turns out to be insignificantly related to re-election, in 
line with most empirical evidence (see, e.g., Peltzman (1992); Aidt et al. (2011) and Alesina 
et al. (2012)).  
Variable illiteracy term is positive when statistically significant, reflecting that the 
ability of the electorate to process available information can affect the incumbent's re-election 
prospects. A possible explanation for this result is that the incumbent may have an advantage 
in informing the voters, which may decrease with the level of voters education/sophistication. 
Milligan et al. (2004) looking at the US and the UK find that more educated citizens appear 
to have more information on candidates and campaigns. Our result may reflect that less 
educated voters may rely more on a narrower set of sources of information influenced by the 
incumbent (e.g., the "popular" media). The same may be true for less "experienced" voters, 
which may explain the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the variable new 
democracy in the majority of specifications in Table 1.22 The transition period to a 
democratic regime may be complemented by an incumbency advantage due to a lower level 
                                                 
21
 Pooled probit equations, though, yielded very similar qualitative results.  
22
 It is reasonable to expect that in new democracies illiteracy rates are higher. In fact, as can be seen in Appendix B, 
variables new democracy and illiteracy term are highly correlated. However, they both seem to affect re-election prospects 
and when we drop one variable at time the results remain unaffected. Thus, we decided to keep both variables in the 
specification as they may reflect different characteristics of the electorate. The former reflects the electoral responses of 
inexperienced voters, and the latter the electoral responses of voters with higher illiteracy rate. Both characteristics may lead 
to a similar voting behaviour. Of course, it is meaningful to expect a multiplicative effect for illiterate voters in new 
democracies. It is worth noting, however, that when we interact these two variables the effect is insignificant. Moreover, 
when we interact these variables with the fiscal variables of interest, again the interaction terms are statistically insignificant.  
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of political competition since it may take time to safeguard democratic principles (e.g., 
freedom of press) and to transform the political system (e.g., number of political parties). For 
example, Keefer (2007) argues that, in younger democracies, political competitors are not 
able to make broadly credible pre-electoral promises to voters.23 
5HJDUGLQJ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V ideology, we obtain a positive but insignificant 
coefficient for the variable left, indicating that the probability of success is identical between 
left-wing and right-wing governments (omitted category). The centre variable is negative and 
insignificantly related to re-election prospects in Table 1. Although, in some other 
(unreported) specifications centre seems to have a negative effect on re-election, this effect is 
not robust. Moreover, variable fragmentation is negative and significantly related to re-
election prospects. This finding may reflect that ideologically fragmented governments are 
more likely to face internal issues that can deteriorate the re-election prospects of the chief 
executive in power. The coalition variable, on the other hand, is insignificantly related to re-
election prospects.24 Finally, we find that the probability of re-election is significantly lower 
for the European Union members in the pre-EMU era after the enforcement of the Maastricht 
treaty. The efforts of this group of countries to implement structural reforms before the 
adoption of the common currency may have proven detrimental for the chief executives in 
power.  
Table 1 here 
 
Turning now to the effect of fiscal performance over the whole term in office on re-
election prospects, in column (1) we find that the coefficient of capital expenditure is 
marginally insignificant, while surplus term is positive and significant at the 10% level. This 
result indicates that an increase of 1 percentage point in budget surplus as a share of GDP 
over the whole term in office can improve the chances of re-election by about 2.6 percentage 
points. On the contrary, in column (3) we find that all fiscal variables are insignificantly 
related to the probability of re-election. 
                                                 
23
 Besley and Part (2006) develop a model that allows for the possibility that the incumbent can influence the media through 
promises and threats. Their empirical evidence indicates that the length of the term of the chief executive or the party 
depends on media characteristics. Prior (2006) shows that the growth of television contributed to the rise in the incumbency 
advantage in U.S.  through its effect on less-educated voters for whom television presented a new, less demanding source of 
news. 
24
 The variable coalition seems to be negatively and significantly related to re-election prospects only in the absence of the 
variables that capture the ideological orientation of the cabinet. In particular, when we drop the variable fragmentation, the 
coefficient of the variable coalition is more than doubled. This is an indication that these two variables are two sides of the 
same coin. However, we choose to keep the variable coalition in our specification because it depicts a significant relation 
with the vote share specification in section 4. 
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As a next step, in columns (2) and (4) we split all fiscal variables in order to 
disentangle the electoral effect of fiscal policy (fiscal variable deviation) versus the effect of 
fiscal policy prior to the election year (fiscal variable non-election). As can be seen in 
columns (2) and (4), electoral policies that affect public investment expenditures (capital 
deviation) or the composition of public spending between capital and current expenditures 
(composition deviation) do not affect re-election prospects. Existing empirical evidence for 
the same sample of countries suggests that capital expenditures decrease during the election 
period (see Katsimi and Sarantides (2012)).25 This finding indicates that an electoral fall in 
capital expenditure does not affect voting behaviour. This result may be attributed to a time-
lag in the visibility of this type of expenditure during the election period. Capital 
expenditures (e.g., infrastructure) are mostly long-term projects that will increasH YRWHUV¶
utility upon completion. Likewise, a change in the expenditure composition initiated by the 
fall in capital expenditure may not affect voting behaviour, because this cut may not visible in 
the election period. On the contrary, the variables capital non-election and composition non-
election, which capture policies prior to the election year, are positive and significantly 
related to re-election.26 More specifically, an increase of 1 percentage point in capital non-
election (composition non-election) can increase the probability of re-election by 13.8 (3.0) 
percentage points.27  
Our results indicate that the timing of public capital spending is important for 
incumbent's re-election: although both term average public investment as well as its level in 
the election year does not seem to affect voting behaviour, capital spending in the years 
before the electoral period does affect re-election probability.  This implies that an incumbent 
who wishes to maximize his re-election prospects should frontload public spending; he 
should spend on capital as soon as he is elected in order to allow for a sufficient period for 
this spending to be materialized and probably observed by voters while he should lower 
                                                 
25
 As already mentioned, in the full specification of the budget constraint that we adopt, we choose as the omitted variable 
current expenditures but our results remain essentially the same if the omitted variable is total revenues. 
26
 A Wald test for the equality of coefficients between the variable capital (composition) deviation and capital (composition) 
non-election in columns (2) and (4) of Table 1 is performed. The value of the Wald test rejects the null of equal coefficients 
of variables capital (composition) deviation to the coefficient of capital (composition) non-election; the p-values are 0.09 
and 0.10 for variables capital and composition, respectively. 
27
 We tested if our results are driven by outlier observations using two different approaches. First, we re-estimated our 
baseline model after dropping one country at a time. Second, we applied the method implemented by Hadi (1992). This 
method measures the distance of data points from the main body of data and then iteratively reduces the sample to exclude 
distant data points. We set the significance level for outlier cut off at p =0.1. Results suggest 2 outlier observations for the 
variables capital deviation, composition deviation, deficit deviation, revenue deviation, and 4 outlier observations for 
variable composition term and composition non-election. However, if we either drop one country at a time or all identified 
outlier observations simultaneously, our qualitative results remain unaffected. 
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capital spending in the final year of his term, when this type of spending is not rewarded by 
voters. 
Regarding the effect of total revenues and budget balances on re-election prospects, 
the former, irrespective of the timing during the term in office, has no effect on the 
probability of re-election.28 On the contrary, and in line with the findings of Brender and 
Drazen (2008), we find that in developed economies, voters dislike deficits and even more so 
if the deficit is perceived as electorally motivated. More specifically, in column (2) we 
observe that a decrease of 1 percentage point in surplus non-election leads to a decrease of 
about 3.9 percentage points in the chances of re-election. The impact of a deficit creation in 
the election period is punished more heavily: a decrease of 1 percentage point in surplus 
deviation leads to a decrease of about 7.7 percentage points in the chances of re-election. 
Accordingly, Brender and Drazen (2008) showed that an increase of 1 percentage point in the 
central government deficit can decrease the probability of re-election by 3-5 percentage 
points, whereas an increase of 1 percentage point in the deficit during an election year 
decrease the probability of re-election by 7-9 percentage points.29  
 
3. Robustness 
The main finding of the previous section is that, although voters seem to reward a high level 
of public investment in the non-election years, a deviation in capital expenditure from this 
level in the election year does not affect voting behaviour. In this section we want to test the 
robustness of this result in the following ways: First, in Table 2 we re-estimate our 
regressions by including capital expenditures and the composition of spending only for the 
election year. Second, in Table 3 we conduct a battery of robustness checks on our main 
regressions in columns (2) and (4) of Table 1, where we distinguish between electoral and 
pre-electoral effects of fiscal policies. More specifically, we check if our results are affected 
by the inclusion of country fixed effects. Moreover, we test if our results remain the same 
when we adjust for the timing of elections. Furthermore, we modify the definition of the 
dependent variable to follow more explicitly the party rather than leader re-election. Finally, 
                                                 
28
 It should be noted that the qualitative results remain essentially the same after dropping revenues from our regressions. 
29
 Although the GFS does not provide data after 1999 for our main variables of interest which are capital and composition, 
we applied the approach of Gemmell et al. (2007) and Katsimi and Sarantides (2012), in order to expand our sample to 2011 
for all other variables. Our results indicate that all macroeconomic variables are correctly signed and are significantly related 
to re-election prospects. Moreover, the variable illiteracy term becomes insignificant. Regarding the fiscal variables, results 
remain similar to those presented in Table 1 apart from the impact of the variable surplus deviation which remains positive 
and significantly related to re-election prospects only when our sample ends in 2007. When we include the period of the 
financial crisis during which fiscal deficits increased substantially for many countries, our results do not show a negative 
effect of deficit creation in the election period on the probability of re-election probably because deficit creation in this 
period was not perceived as the result of electoral manipulation (results available upon request). 
 16 
we distinguish between coalition and single-party cabinets, and we re-estimate our baseline 
specification only for the latter. Due to space limitation only fiscal variables are reported in 
Table 3.30 
 
3.1. The level of fiscal policy and macroeconomic conditions around elections 
Following previous studies, in our baseline specification in order to capture the electoral 
effect of fiscal performance we use the deviation of election year value from the average 
value of non-election years (see Veiga and Veiga (2007); Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 
(2008)). According to the literature, the change rather than the level of fiscal policy variables 
reflect better the impact of the incumbent on policy outcomes (see Brender and Drazen 
(2008)). However, in Table 2 we test if including the level rather than the deviation of fiscal 
variables in the election year affects our results (see, e.g., Jones et al. (2012)). Moreover, we 
test if controlling for the impact of the macroeconomic variables in the election year may 
affect the re-election prospects. We run the regressions including the level of fiscal and 
macroeconomic variables in the election year, and not their term average or their non- 
election years average for two reasons. First, when we calculate the average for the whole 
term in office, we include the value of the election year. Second, the value of fiscal and 
macroeconomic variables in the election year is highly correlated with the average in the 
previous years of the term, which can significantly distort the results. Hence, in columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 2, we re-run the regressions of columns (1) and (3) of Table 1, including the 
value of fiscal and macroeconomic variables in the election year rather than the average value 
of the whole term.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the level of public investment expenditures in the election year, 
namely the variable capital, has no significant impact on re-election prospects. The same 
holds also for the variables revenues and composition. However, in accordance with our 
previous findings, the variable surplus affects significantly the probability of re-election. 
Regarding macroeconomic conditions, once again only the inflation rate has a significant 
negative impact on re-election prospects. Moreover, as far as the other control variables are 
                                                 
30
 The full set of results is available upon request. 
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concerned, the qualitative results presented in Table 2 remain very similar to those depicted 
in columns (1) and (3) of Table 1.  
 
3.2. Country fixed effects 
As already mentioned, the specification tests that we performed and the characteristics of our 
panel induce us to use the pooled logit model as our basic specification. However, we want to 
exclude the possibility that the results presented in Table 1 are driven by country specific 
characteristics. Regarding our main variables of interest, if the share of investment 
expenditures over GDP differs systematically between countries, and those countries with 
higher shares of investment expenditures have more stable governments, then this would 
certainly influence the estimation results. Therefore, in this sub-section we want to assess the 
robustness of our results by introducing country fixed effects in our estimations. To do that 
we apply the conditional logit model as proposed by Chamberlain (1980), which is the only 
non-linear estimator designed for binary models, as in our case, which allows obtaining 
consistent estimates through a fixed effects-like approach.31   
As can be seen in the first two columns of Table 3, the inclusion of fixed effects does 
not alter the statistical significance of our main variables of interest. More specifically, 
capital deviation and composition deviation remain insignificant, capital non-election is 
significant close at the 1% level, whereas variable composition non-election is significant at 
the 10% level. Moreover, as before, variables surplus deviation and surplus non-election 
have a statistically significant effect on re-election prospects.  
 
3.3. The timing of elections  
Regarding the timing of elections, the first check we perform is WRH[FOXGHµHDUO\¶HOHFWLRQV
from our sample, since they can introduce an important bias in our results. As argued by 
Heckelman and Berument (1998), the timing of elections may not be exogenous but is chosen 
strategically by the incumbent when economic conditions and the re-election probability are 
favourable, raising issues of a reverse causation in our specification. Moreover, Rogoff 
(1990) argues that, during predetermined elections, opportunistic incumbents have ample 
time to use fiscal policy in order to increase re-election probabilities, far greater than in the 
case of elections being called earlier. Consistent with that theoretical prediction, Katsimi and 
                                                 
31Two issues are worth noting here. First, the conditional logit estimator drops observations for Finland and France, because 
the re-election variable shows no variation. Second, we report logit coefficients in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 instead of 
marginal effects, because the latter could not be estimated with respect to the fixed effect specification. 
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Sarantides (2012) found that, only during predetermined elections, incumbents reduce capital 
expenditures and shift the composition of expenditures towards public investment. Hence, in 
line with Brender and Drazen (2005), we look at the constitutionally determined election 
interval, and we keep in our sample those elections that are characterized as predetermined 
and are held during the expected year of the constitutionally fixed term. As can be seen in 
column (3) of Table 3, excluding early elections does not affect the statistical significance of 
the variable capital non-election. More precisely, we observe that an increase of 1 percentage 
point in capital non-election leads to an increase of about 11.9 percentage points in the 
chances of re-election during predetermined elections. Although the value of the coefficient 
of composition non-election in column (4) increases compare to the one reported in Table 1, 
it becomes marginally insignificant. However, this result seems to be driven by the cases of 
the predetermined elections where the leader does not spent the whole term in office. 32   
Variable surplus loses its significance during predetermined elections. This is in direct 
analogy with Brender and Drazen (2008), who also find that in predetermined elections their 
result that voters punish election and pre-election year deficits in old democracies is not 
robust. 33 
One could further argue that an endogeneity bias can arise if an incumbent certain of 
winning by a large margin may not manipulate expenditure, as in the case of a close race. 
However, this source of endogeneity may not be important, since on the one hand, it is not 
obvious why a strategy that helps re-election will only be followed by unpopular incumbents 
(see Brender (2003)), and, on the other hand, even incumbents who are certain about their re-
election will still have an incentive to increase the number of the Parliament seats for their 
party (see Veiga and Veiga (2007)).  
                                                 
32It is worth noting that when we keep in the sample only the cases of the predetermined elections where the leader spent the 
whole term in office, coefficient of the variable composition non-election appears statistically significant whereas the 
coefficients of the variables capital non-election and composition non-election increase beyond the level of those depicted in 
Table 1. Moreover, when we attempt to capture the long term effect of public investment on re-election probability by 
including public investment in the first year of the term in office, our results indicate a positive impact of the initial public 
investment on the probability of re-election. Results available upon request. 
33
 An alternative approach to test for the impact of early elections, without however addressing the endogeneity issues, is to 
interact a dummy variable for early elections with the fiscal variables. In order to avoid the complications of interaction 
terms in non-linear models, we follow the approach of Ai and Norton (2003) which encompasses not only statistical 
procedures but also graphical presentations. The graphical presentation of the interaction term is extremely useful, because, 
according to the authors, the interaction effect depends on other covariates and it can vary widely in sign and size, making 
the average value generated by their statistical procedure not reliable in many instances. Given that we have only 106 
observations we can only rely on the average value of the interaction term. When we apply the proposed statistical procedure 
to variables capital and composition, our results, available upon request, indicate a significant and negative coefficient for 
the interaction term on the capital non-election variable. This implies that in early elections the impact of capital spending in 
the non-election period on the re-election probability is lower, which is consistent with the interpretation of the results 
presented in this section.  
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Another form of endogeneity bias is that a known change in political majority may 
affect public spending if the incumbent has different preferences over the level or the 
composition of public spending than the opposition (see, among others, Persson and 
Svensson (1989); Alesina and Tabellini (1990); and Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994)). In 
our case, an incumbent with low popularity and a higher relative preference for current 
expenditure than his opponent may raise this type of expenditure at the expense of capital 
spending. Following Brender (2003), we attempted to minimize the possibility of an 
endogeneity bias in the following ways: First, we tried to mitigate the effect of popularity on 
public spending by controlling for the share of votes received in the previous elections. The 
inclusion of this variable has no impact to our results and its coefficient is statistically 
insignificant in every specification. Therefore, we exclude it from our specification. 
Moreover, by looking at the data, we found very weak evidence suggesting that the most 
unpopular incumbents adopted the largest cuts in public spending before elections in order to 
improve their popularity. More specifically, in the case of single-party governments, we 
found that, among the incumbents that decreased the capital to current expenditure ratio by 
the largest amount, the highest percentage (55%) belonged in the middle of the distribution, 
according to the share of votes they received, while 15% belonged in the upper quartile and 
30% in the bottom quartile of our sample.34  
Finally, one very important issue concerns the specific dates that elections took place 
during the term in office. More specifically, in our specification the term in office starts after 
the year that elections took place, and finishes in the election year of the end of the term. 
However, one might argue that if the election was held in January, the newly elected 
JRYHUQPHQWFDQLQIOXHQFHQH[W\HDU¶VH[SHQGLWXUHV, while if elections were held later in the 
year, the incumbent may not had enough time to affect fiscal policy instruments.  In order to 
deal with this problem to the degree possible, we adjust our specification to take into account 
whether elections took place in the first or in the second half of the year (see Vergne (2009)).  
More specifically, if the election took place in the first half of the year, we define as election 
year the year before the election. Alternatively, if the election took place in the second half of 
the year, we define as election year the year of the election. For example if an election took 
place in January 1990 and the next election in December 1993, in the new specification the 
term is defined as the 1990-1993 period. On the contrary, if an election took place in 
                                                 
34
 We restrict our attention to single party incumbents since in coalition governments, the expected difference in the 
preferences between the party in power and the opposition party is less clear. Moreover, ranking incumbents according to 
popularity is more meaningful in single party governments since the share of votes received by the incumbent is in this case 
better comparable between countries. 
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December 1990 and the next election in January 1993, the term is defined as 1991-1992. In 
columns (5) and (6) of Table 3, we estimate regressions (2) and (4) of Table 1 after re-
adjusting our sample for this new definition of term and election year. As can be seen, the 
qualitative results for fiscal variables capital and revenues are in line with those depicted in 
Table 1. Once again, the effect of variable surplus becomes weaker.  
 
 
Table 3 here 
 
3.4. Party vs. leader re-election 
The definition of the re-election variable in our baseline specification, which is broadly 
consistent with the definition of Brender and Drazen (2008), is restricted in order to follow 
the leader of the party in power until the election year. Although, in that way the re-election 
variable allows for a clearer relationship between the leader and his/her policies, it does not 
allow for a broader relationship between the party and its policies. Hence, at this point we set 
the value of the re-election variable equal to 1 if the newly elected president/prime minister is 
from the same party as the predecessor, irrespective of whether his predecessor quits in the 
election year for whatever reason. As expected, in some cases the values of the two key 
political variables deviate. Hence, when the leader in office resigns within the year of election 
variable leader re-election takes value 0, while party re-election takes value 1 if the 
successor leader comes from the same party and gets re-elected. By following parties that 
have been in office for at least 2 years we have 115 campaigns in which the party in power 
was re-elected in 71 cases. It is worth noting that the term in office is adjusted from 
appointment to termination of parties rather than of individual leaders. 
In columns (7) and (8) of Table 3, results for the variables capital and composition 
and revenues are in line with those depicted in Table 1. Party re-election does not seem to be 
affected by the level of deficit in the non-election year although our previous results indicate 
that voters punish the leader of the party for a rise in deficit in the election year. This could 
reflect the fact that when the leader in office resigns within the year of election and the 
successor leader comes from the same party (variable leader re-election takes value 0, while 
party re-election takes value 1) voters are more lenient in judging the policy choices of the 
successor leader who has been in power for only a few months. The same holds for the 
variable surplus deviation which becomes insignificant in column (7), while it is statistically 
significant only at the 10% level in column (8).  
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3.5. Single-party incumbents 
Until now, we have included in our regressions observations in which the chief executive can 
be the leader of a coalition, but also of a single-party government. The final robustness check 
that we apply in our basic specification is to exclude from our regressions coalition 
incumbents. Although until now we include a dummy variable to control for this category of 
incumbents, we perform this check for two reasons. First, because, although our re-election 
variable takes the value 0 in cases where the leader after the election comes from a different 
party, this change can simply be a routine personnel replacement in a stable coalition 
government (see Alesina et al. (2012)). Second, an interesting issue concerning this literature 
is that coalition governments caQEHPRUHKHWHURJHQHRXVDQGµYXOQHUDEOH¶WKDQVLQJOH-party 
governments (see, e.g., Alesina et al. (1997)), and as a consequence, they adopt different 
fiscal policies raising issues of reverse causation in our specification (see, e.g., Roubini and 
Sachs (1989); Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002)). Although when we drop coalition incumbents 
from our estimations we are left with only 52 observations, given the issues related to 
coalition incumbents, we find essential to follow the terms of individual leaders in office only 
for the cases of single-party governments.  
In columns (9) and (10) of Table 3, results indicate an even stronger connection 
running from the variables capital/composition non-election to re-election prospects. More 
precisely, we observe that an increase of 1 percentage point in capital non-election 
(composition non-election) improves the probability of re-election by about 20.8 (4.2) 
percentage points. Once again, the variable revenues is insignificantly related to re-election 
prospects, whereas the variable surplus loses its significance.35 
Concluding, the results of all robustness tests reported in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that 
our basic results concerning the impact of public investment on an incumbent's re-election 
chances are robust to a wide variety of different specifications performed in this section. 
More specifically, all our results suggest that public investment in the non-election years is 
rewarded by voters whereas its change, or its level, in the election year does not affect the re-
election probability. Moreover, in all specifications the level of revenues in the non-election 
period as well as the electoral deviation of revenues does not seem to affect re-election 
prospects. Finally, regarding the impact of deficits there is some very weak evidence for a 
                                                 
35
 However, we should bear in mind that the low number of observations does not allow us a safe inference.  For instance, 
although our results for public investment are not sensitive to the inclusion of specific countries, the significance of the 
coefficient on surplus is particularly affected by the inclusion of Norway in the estimations.  
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negative impact of deficits on re-election prospects in the non-election years whereas there is 
mixed evidence about how the change in deficit in the election period affects voting 
behaviour. Nevertheless, as in Brender and Drazen (2008), we find that in all specifications 
deficit creation is not rewarded by voters in developed established democracies.   
 
4. The Voting Function 
Following previous studies in this area, we have so far examined the impact of fiscal and 
economic performance on the probability of re-election using binary models (see, among 
others, Brender (2003); Brender and Drazen (2008); Buti et al. (2010)). Although an 
important strand of the literature examines the impact of fiscal and economic performance of 
the vote share received by the incumbent (see, e.g., Peltzman (1992); Chappell and Veiga 
(2000); Jones et al. (2012)) we chose the binary model as our basic specification in order to 
be able to compare our results to the literature closest to our paper (see Brender and Drazen 
(2008)). This set up allowed us to concentrate our attention on the determinants of the 
probability that the incumbent will be re-elected. Many theoretical models with office 
motivated politicians assume that incumbents maximize their re-election probability rather 
than their popularity (see Rogoff (1990); Shi and Svensson (2006); Katsimi and Sarantides 
(2012)). In the single party government framework assumed in these papers, a rise in the vote 
share is equivalent to a rise in the re-election probability. However, in the case of coalition 
governments, the incumbent party may manage to win a larger share of votes compared to 
SUHYLRXVHOHFWLRQVZLWKRXWEHLQJDEOHWRUHPDLQLQSRZHUGXHWRFKDQJHVLQWKHRWKHUVSDUWLHV¶
numbers of seats.36 Thus, the binary framework may disregard important information 
regarding voters' behaviour because, although incumbents can lose votes from one election to 
another, they can still in some cases get re-elected. The significant advantage of the voting 
function is its sensitivity to changes in popular support for incumbents (see Veiga (2013)).  
 Hence, our final step in this study is to investigate the effect of electoral and pre-
electoral policies on the vote share of the incumbent. Our dependent variable is the ratio of 
the number of votes obtained by the incumbent party (or parties in case of coalition 
incumbents) to the total number of valid votes in the current election. Alternatively, though, 
we follow only the vote share received by the party of the chief executive in power.37 The 
                                                 
36
 In our sample, we have 13 cases where the party of the chief executive gets a larger share of votes, whereas the popularity 
of the other parties that comprise the coalition government moves the opposite direction. However, in only 3 of these cases 
(Ireland 1987 and Sweden 1982, 1983) the chief executive was replaced.  
37
 For the second definition of the dependent variable we have two observations less than for the first definition, because in 
France the UDR, which was the main incumbent party after the election in 1973, was dissolved in 1976 and did not 
participate in the election of 1978. Moreover, in Portugal we cannot follow the vote share of the main incumbent party in the 
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homogeneity of the latter definition can reflect a clearer relationship between fiscal and 
economic performance with the vote share. Additionally to the control variables we used in 
the previous specifications, we follow common studies, and we include the vote share 
obtained by the incumbent party (or parties in case of coalition incumbents) in the previous 
election.  
A drawback of this specification is that the vote share variable is bounded between 0 
and 1 and therefore it does not satisfy the classic assumptions of the linear regression model. 
If we simply use a linear estimation method, the estimated vote shares are not constrained to 
lie within this interval. However, a simple logistic transformation of the dependent solves this 
problem, making the dependent variable range from negative infinity to positive infinity, 
eliminating predictions outside the allowable range (see, e.g., Veiga (2013)). Therefore, we 
estimate the following equation:  
 
                                                      (1) 
 
In order to apply this transformation in our estimated equation, we choose to employ two 
econometric models. First, we consider the fractional logit estimator, as proposed by Papke 
and Wooldridge (2008). This is a quasi-maximum likelihood method that yields consistent 
estimates when the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1. Second, we use the 
logistic transformation of the dependent variable in the Ordinary Least Squares estimator 
including country fixed effects so that to control for factors that remain constant over time.  
Estimation results for equation (1) are shown in Table 4. It is worth noting that when 
we estimate the vote function for the main incumbent party, our results indicate a stronger 
effect of fiscal and economic performance on the vote share (see the right hand side of Table 
4). Indeed, as expected, voters seem to consider the main incumbent party as more 
responsible for economic policies and react to its decisions more consistently.  
For our main variables of interest, capital and composition results are in line with 
those depicted in the binary specification of the previous section. More specifically, variables 
capital deviation and composition deviation are insignificantly related to the vote share in all 
estimations. For the variable capital non-election, especially when related to the main 
incumbent party, we get a robust positive effect. In columns (5) and (7), the results indicate 
                                                                                                                                                        
election of 1983 because the Social Democratic Party contested together in the election of 1980 with the Democratic and 
Social Centre and the People's Monarchist Party.  
 24 
that an increase in capital non-election increases the vote share of the main incumbent party 
in the pooled and the fixed effect estimation by 1.1 and 1.6 percentage points, respectively. 
Hence, as expected, average pre-electoral public investment expenditures enhance the 
popularity of the main incumbent party in the next elections. For the variable composition 
non-election we get some weak evidence that it is positively related to the vote share of the 
incumbent.   
 
Table 4 here 
 
Regarding the impact of the remaining fiscal variables on the vote share of the 
incumbent, revenues are insignificantly related to the dependent variable in all but one 
estimation in Table 4. These results are consistent with our previous findings using the binary 
model, where government revenues did not display any relation to the probability of re-
election. Moreover, the coefficient of surplus deviation and surplus non-election is 
statistically insignificant in columns (1)-(4). On the contrary, when the dependent variable is 
the vote share of the incumbent party, surplus deviation has a statistically significant effect 
on the vote share in most cases [see columns (5), (6) and (7)]. More specifically, an increase 
of one percentage point in the deviation of the budget deficit from the average of the previous 
years of the term, reduces the vote share of the main incumbent part between 0.36 and 0.48 
percentage points.  
Regarding the set of control variables included in our specifications, we observe that 
the coefficient for the variable vote sharet-1 is positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that governments that received a higher percentage of votes in the previous election, tend to 
perform better in the subsequent elections (see, among others, Veiga (2013)). With respect to 
the macroeconomic conditions, although in our previous results the inflation rate was the 
most important determinant of the probability of re-election, in the voting function this holds 
for the growth rate of output. Moreover, when we include fixed effects in the estimations, the 
growth rate of output has a larger effect where we follow the number of votes obtained by the 
incumbent party (or parties in case of coalition incumbents) in comparison to the 
specification where we follow only the vote share of the main incumbent party. More 
specifically, as can be seen in columns (3)-(4) of Table 4, an increase of one percentage point 
in the average growth rate of output during the term in office enhances the popularity of 
government parties in the next elections by around 1.8 percentage points. The same variable 
in columns (7)-(8) of Table 4 increases the popularity of the main incumbent party by around 
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1.2 percentage points. Regarding the inflation rate and the unemployment rate during the 
term in office, both variables are statistically significant and have the expected signs when 
related to the vote share of the main incumbent party in columns (5)±(6). However, when we 
include fixed effects in the estimations in columns (7) and (8) their statistical significance 
disappears. 
As far as the variable new democracy is concerned, our results contradict the positive 
impact of 'young' democracy on the re-election chances of the incumbent suggested by the 
estimation of our binary model in Tables 1 and 2. A possible explanation is that the 
LQFXPEHQWSDUWLHVLQµQHZGHPRFUDFLHV¶DUHOHVVHVWDEOLVKHGLQFRPSDULVRQWRWKHSDUWLHVLQ
old democracies, leading to narrower support bases among the electorate. Moving to the 
variables that capture the ideological orientation/fragmentation of the incumbent, the results 
do not indicate any robust effect on the vote share of the incumbent. On the contrary, the 
variable coalition is statistically significant and has a positive sign when related to the vote 
share of the government party (parties) in columns (1)-(2), though this result disappears when 
we include fixed effects in the estimations in columns (3)-(4). Nonetheless, when we follow 
the main incumbent party, results in columns (7)-(8) indicate that its popularity tends to erode 
in the subsequent elections when it is part of a coalition government. Finally, consistent with 
our findings in the binary model, we find that the efforts of the European countries in the pre-
EMU era to comply with the Maastricht criteria were detrimental to the popularity of the 
government party (parties) in power.  
 
 
 5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates whether electoral manipulation of the level and the composition of 
fiscal policy could affect re-election prospects. We find evidence that in developed countries 
that are established democracies, re-election prospects of the incumbent improve with the 
level of capital spending in the non-election years. On the contrary, a rise in public 
investment in the election year does not have significant effects on voting behaviour or re-
election prospects. These results remain valid if we exclude endogenous elections, if we 
allow for different definitions of the election year and if we include only single party 
incumbents. Moreover, they hold for leader re-election as well as party re-election, and are 
found when estimating both a binary model as well as a voting function.  
Voters preferences for capital spending in the years preceding elections in contrast to 
their indifference about public investment in the election year seems consistent with  
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5RJRII¶VDVVXPSWLRQ of low visibility of capital spending (e.g., infrastructure) around 
elections. Capital expenditures are mostly long-WHUPSURMHFWVWKDWZLOOLQFUHDVHYRWHUV¶XWLOLW\
upon completion. Capital spending during the non-election years allows for a sufficient 
period in order for this spending to be observed by voters. This may not hold for public 
investment in the election year. Our results may reflect this timing characteristic of the 
visibility of capital spending.  
Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) find evidence suggesting that in developed, established 
democracies public investment falls in the election period. They argue that in the framework 
of a moral hazard-based political budget cycle model with rational expectations and 
information asymmetries between voters and policymakers (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini 
(2000); Shi and Svensson (2006)) the incumbent has an incentive to shift away from less 
µYLVLEOH¶ FDSLWDO H[SHQGLWXUH WRZDUGV PRUH µYLVLEOH¶ ILVFDO LWHPV in order to signal his 
competence to the electorate. Voters cannot be fooled and they fully expect this behaviour. 
Our results imply that this type of electoral manipulation will not be punished by voters.  
Regarding the political cost of deficit, we obtain similar results to Brender and Drazen 
(2008) and Alesina et al. (2012) that voters in developed countries do not reward deficit 
creation. This is consistent with the empirical studies that find no evidence of deficit cycles in 
these countries (see Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) and Brender and Drazen (2013)). In fact, 
our results suggest that a 'fiscal irresponsible' behaviour of governments in developed 
established democracies leading to budget cycles, would not improve their vote share or their 
re-election prospects.  More than that, we find that in some cases decreasing deficits could be 
an efficient re-election strategy. 
Finally, we find that, in line with existing literature, voters dislike inflation whereas 
there is some rather weak evidence for unemployment aversion. A high illiteracy rate seems 
to favour the incumbent under all specifications.  A possible explanation is that the low level 
of voters' education may restrict the sources of information they use to those that can be 
influenced by the incuPEHQW7KHLPSDFWRIDµ\RXQJ¶GHPRFUDF\RQWKHUH-election chances 
of the incumbent is not clear since our results from the estimation of the binary model 
contradict those obtained by estimating a voting function. In the first period after the 
transition to a democratic regime, the less-developed democratic structure may imply a lower 
level of political competition that favours the incumbent but at the same time the incumbent 
parties may be less established, in comparison to the parties in old democracies, leading to 
narrower support bases among the electorate. 
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We also find a decrease in the popularity of governments in the period before the 
adoption of the Euro, which is reflected both in a fall in the re-election probability and in the 
vote share. Moreover, although government turnover seems to be the same for left, right or 
centre governments, ideological fragmented governments seem to face lower re-election 
chances.  
The main implication of our paper is that in developed, established democracies 
increasing revenue in order to finance public investment and a high capital/current 
expenditure ratio in the non-election years can increase the incumbent's vote share and 
improve the probability of re-election. In contrast, voters do not seem to reward capital 
spending in the election years when deficit decreasing policies may be more efficient in 
gaining re-election.  
  
 28 
References 
Ai, C. & Norton, E. (2003). Interaction terms in logit and probit models, Economics Letters, 
80(1), 123-129. 
 
Aidt, S., Veiga, J. & Veiga, G. (2011). Election Results and Opportunistic Policies: A New 
Test of the Rational Political Business Cycle Model, Public Choice, 148 (1-2), 21-44. 
 
Akhmedov, A. & Zhuravskaya, E. (2004). Opportunistic political cycles: test in a young 
democracy setting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (4), 1301-1338. 
 
Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(3), 651-678. 
 
Alesina, A., Carloni, D., & Lecce, G. (2012). The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal 
Adjustments, NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc. 
 
Alesina, A., Perotti R., & Tavares J. (1998). The Political Economy of Fiscal Adjustments, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 28(1), 197-248. 
 
Alesina, A. & Rosenthal H. (1995). Partisan Politics, Divided Government and the Economy, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Alesina, A., Roubini, N., & Cohen G. D. (1997). Political cycles and the macroeconomy. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Alesina, A. & Tabellini G. (1990). A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government 
Debt in a Democracy, Review of Economic Studies, 57(3), 403-414. 
 
Armingeon, K., Gerber, M., Leimgruber, P. & Beyeler, M. (2008): The comparative political 
data set 1960-2006. Berne: institute of political science, University of Berne. 
 
Barro, R., & Lee, J. (2010): A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-
2010, NBER Working Paper No. 15902. 
 
Besley, T. & Case, A. (1995). Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3), 769-798. 
 
Besley, T. & Prat, A. (2006). Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and 
Government Accountability, American Economic Review, 96 (3), 720-736. 
 
Bleaney, M., Gemmell N. & Kneller, R. (2001). Testing the endogenous growth model: 
public expenditure, taxation, and growth over the long run, Canadian Journal of Economics, 
34(1), 36-57. 
 
Brender, A. (2003). The Effect of Fiscal Performance on Local Government Election Results 
in Israel: 1989-1998, Journal of Public Economics, 87 (9-10), 2187-2205. 
  
Brender, A. & Drazen A. (2005). Political budget cycles in new versus established 
democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7), 1271-1295. 
 29 
 
Brender, A. & Drazen A. (2008). How do budget deficits and economic growth affect 
reelection prospects? Evidence from a large panel of countries. American Economic Review, 
98(5), 2203-2220.  
 
Brender, A. & Drazen A. (2013). Elections, Leaders, and the Composition of Government 
Spending, Journal of Public Economics, 97, 18-31. 
 
Buti, M., Turrini, A., Van den Noord, P. & Biroli, P. (2010). Reforms and re-elections in 
OECD countries, Economic Policy, 25(1), 61-116. 
 
Chamberlain, G. (1980). Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data, Review of Economic 
Studies, 47 (1), 225-238. 
 
Chappell, H. & Keech, W. (2000). The Unemployment Consequences of Partisan Monetary 
Policy, Southern Economic Journal, 55(1), 107-22. 
 
Chappell, H. & Veiga L. (1988). Economics and Elections in Western Europe: 1960-97, 
Electoral Studies, 19(2-3), 183-198. 
 
Drazen, A. & Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral Manipulation via Voter-Friendly Spending: 
Theory and Evidence, Journal of Development Economics, 92(1), 39-52. 
 
Efthyvoulou, G. (2012). Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of 
political pressures. Public Choice, 153(3), 295-327. 
 
Gemmell, N., Kneller, R. & Sanz, I. (2007). Tax composition and economic growth in OECD 
countries, Mimeo. 
 
Goodhart, C. & Bhansali, J. (1970). Political Economy, Political Studies, 18(1), 43-106. 
 
Hadi, A. (1992). Identifying Multiple Outliers in Multivariate Data. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series B, 54(3), 761±771. 
 
Heckelman, J. C. & Berument, H. (1998). Political business cycles and endogenous elections. 
Southern Economic Journal, 64(4), 987±1000. 
 
Henderson, D. & Kumbhakar, S. (2006). Public and Private Capital Productivity Puzzle: A 
Nonparametric Approach, Southern Economic Journal, 73(1), 219-232. 
 
Henisz, J. (2000). The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth. Economics and 
Politics, 12(1), 1-31. 
 
Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science 
Review, 71(4), 467-487. 
 
Hodler, R, S. Loertscher S., & Rohner D. (2010). Inefficient Policies and Incumbency 
Advantage, Journal of Public Economics, 94(9-10), 761-767. 
 
 30 
Jones, M., Meloni, O. & Tommasi, M. (2012). Voters as Fiscal Liberals: Incentives and 
Accountability in Federal Systems, Economics and Politics, 24(2), 135-156.  
 
Katsimi, M. & Sarantides, V. (2012). Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in 
developed, established democracies, Public Choice, 151(1), 325-362. 
 
Keefer, P. (2007). Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies, 
American Journal of Political Science 51(4), 804±821. 
 
Keefer, P. (2012). Database on Political Institutions: changes and variable definitions, The 
World Bank. 
 
Khemani, S. (2004). Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the 
Indian states. Journal of Development Economics, 73(1), 125-154. 
 
Klomp, J. & De Haan, J. (2013). Do political budget cycles really exist?, Applied Economics, 
45(3), 329-341. 
 
Kramer, G. (1971). Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896±1964. American 
Political Science Review 65(1), 131-143. 
 
Kneller, R., Bleaney,  M. & Gemmell N. (1999). Fiscal policy and growth: evidence from 
OECD countries. Journal of Public Economics, 74(2), 171-90. 
 
Lewis-Beck, M. & Paldam, M. (2000). Economic Voting: An Introduction, Electoral Studies 
19 (2-3), 113-121. 
 
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. & Spolaore, E. (1994). How Cynical can an incumbent be? Strategic 
policy in a model of government spending. Journal of Public Economics, 55(1), 121-140. 
 
Milligan, K., Moretti, E., & Oreopoulos, P. (2004). Does education improve citizenship? 
Evidence from the U.S and the U.K., Journal of Public Economics, 88 (3), 1667±1695. 
 
Mueller, J. (1970). Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson, American Political 
Science Review, 64(1), 18-33. 
 
Nannestad, P. & Paldam, M. (1994). The VP-function: a survey of the literature on vote and 
popularity functions after 25 years. Public Choice, 79 (3-4), 213±245. 
 
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 
169-190. 
 
Norpoth, H., Lewis-Beck, M.S., Lafay, J.-D. (Eds.), 1991. Economics and Politics: The 
Calculus of Support. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI. 
 
Paldam, M. (1981). A preliminary survey of the theories and findings on vote and popularity 
functions, European Journal of Political Research, 9(2), 181-199.  
 
Papke, L. & Wooldridge, M., (2008). Panel data methods for fractional response variables 
with an application to test pass rates, Journal of Econometrics, 145(1-2), 121-133. 
 31 
 
Pande, R. (2011). Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-
Income Democracies, Annual Review of Economics, 3(1), 215-237. 
 
Paul, S., Sahni, B. & Biswal, B. (2004). Public Infrastructure and the Productive Performance 
of Canadian Manufacturing Industries, Southern Economic Journal, 70(4), 998-1011. 
 
Peltzman, S. (1992). Voters as fiscal conservatives. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
107(2), 327-361. 
 
Persson, T. & Svensson, L. (1989). Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: 
Policy with Time Consistent Preferences, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(2), 325-345.  
 
Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. (2000). Political economics: Explaining Economic Policy, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Perotti, R., & Kontopoulos, Y. (2002). Fragmented Fiscal Policy. Journal of Public 
Economics, 86(2), 191-222. 
 
Potrafke, N. (2011). Does government ideology influence budget composition? Empirical 
evidence from OECD countries, Economics of Governance, 12 (2), 101-134. 
 
Prior, P. (2006). The Incumbent in the Living Room: The Rise of Television and the 
Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections. Journal of Politics, 68(3), 657-673.  
 
Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review, 80(1), 
21-36. 
 
Roubini, N. & Sachs J. (1989). Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial 
Economies, NBER Working Papers 2919. 
 
Sakurai, S. & Menezes-Filho, N. (2008). Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian 
municipalities. Public Choice, 137(1), 301-314. 
 
Schuknecht, L. (1996). Political business cycles and fiscal policies in developing countries. 
Kyklos, 49(2), 155±170. 
 
Schuknecht, L. (2000). Fiscal policy cycles and public expenditure in developing countries. 
Public Choice, 102(1-2), 115-130. 
 
Shi, M., & Svensson J. (2003). Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments, 
Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 29, 67-76. 
 
Shi, M., & Svensson J. (2006). Political budget cycles: do they differ across countries and 
why? Journal of Public Economics, 90(8-9), 1367-1389. 
 
Veiga, L. (2013). Voting functions in the EU-15, Public Choice, 157(3-4), 411-428. 
 
Veiga, L. & Veiga, F. (2007). Does opportunism pay off?, Economics Letters, 96(2), 177-
182. 
 32 
 
Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing 
countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 63-77.  
 
 33 
Appendix A. Data sources and descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.dev. Min Max Source 
leader re-election  106 0.547 0.500 0 1 ³:RUOG6WDWHVPHQ´
encyclopedia, (WSe)"Inter-
Parliamentary Union(IPU)" 
database 
party re-election 115 0.617 0.488 0 1 WSe and IPU 
votes share 105 0.447 0.085 0.160 0.711 IPU 
vote share (main party) 104 0.359 0.091 0.160 0.588 IPU 
capital  106 2.608 1.389 0.320 6.744 Global Development Network 
Growth Database (GDNGD) 
capital term (L) 106 2.673 1.345 0.416 6.734 GDNGD 
capital deviation (L) 106 -0.093 0.371 -1.266 0.985 GDNGD 
capital non-election (L)  100 2.707 1.383 0.430 6.987 GDNGD 
capital deviation (L adjusted) 100 -0.103 0.432 -1.129 1.344 GDNGD 
capital non-election (L adjusted)  100 2.707 1.383 0.430 6.987 GDNGD 
capital deviation (P) 115 -0.068 0.386 -1.266 0.985 GDNGD 
capital non-election (P)  115 2.690 1.333 0.416 6.734 GDNGD 
composition 106 7.872 4.398 1.300 25.300 GDNGD 
composition term (L) 106 8.183 4.374 1.800 25.900 GDNGD 
composition deviation (L) 106 -0.442 1.022 -3.400 3.400 GDNGD 
composition non-election (L) 106 8.316 4.397 1.700 26.300 GDNGD 
composition deviation (L adjusted) 100 -0.513 1.238 -4.700 3.400 GDNGD 
composition non-election (L adjusted) 100 8.374 4.499 1.700 26.300 GDNGD 
composition deviation (P) 115 -0.451 1.047 -3.400 3.400 GDNGD 
composition non-election (P) 115 8.729 4.947 1.700 26.500 GDNGD 
surplus 106 -4.144 4.365 -21.317 5.308 GDNGD 
surplus term (L) 106 -4.122 3.929 -14.565 4.874 GDNGD 
surplus deviation (L) 106 -0.058 2.491 -9.002 6.390 GDNGD 
surplus non-election (L) 106 -4.086 3.972 -12.935 5.403 GDNGD 
surplus deviation (L adjusted) 100 0.028 2.701 -9.127 6.390 GDNGD 
surplus non-election (L adjusted) 100 0.028 2.701 -9.127 6.390 GDNGD 
surplus deviation (P) 115 -0.182 2.566 -9.002 6.390 GDNGD 
surplus non-election (P) 115 -4.042 3.844 -12.935 5.403 GDNGD 
revenues 106 33.051 8.913 9.633 51.004 GDNGD 
revenues term (L) 106 33.018 8.875 10.249 51.520 GDNGD 
revenues deviation (L)  106 0.038 1.730 -8.483 5.144 GDNGD 
revenues non-election (L) 106 33.014 8.923 10.557 51.692 GDNGD 
revenues deviation (L adjusted)  100 0.162 2.022 -11.079 5.144 GDNGD 
revenues non-election (L adjusted) 100 33.035 8.969 10.557 52.016 GDNGD 
revenues deviation (P)  115 0.104 1.705 -8.483 5.144 GDNGD 
revenues non-election (P) 115 32.462 9.306 9.799 51.692 GDNGD 
growth 106 2.989 2.472 -6.244 11.680 World Bank Development 
indicators (WDI) 
growth term (L) 106 2.683 1.556 -1.019 8.832 WDI 
growth term (P) 115 2.800 1.549 -1.019 8.832 WDI 
inflation 106 6.613 5.185 -0.136 25.106 WDI 
inflation term (L) 106 7.246 5.146 0.284 24.318 WDI 
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inflation term (P) 115 7.285 5.178 0.373 24.318 WDI 
unemployment 106 7.603 4.326 0.670 22.776 OECD Labour Force 
Statistics 
unemployment term (L) 106 7.379 4.242 0.479 23.095 OECD Labour Force 
Statistics 
unemployment term (P) 115 6.584 3.778 0.502 18.455 OECD Labour Force 
Statistics 
new democracy (L) 106 0.075 0.265 0 1 Polity IV project 
new democracy (P) 115 0.087 0.283 0 1 Polity IV project 
illiteracy 106 4.398 6.260 0.100 34.300 Barro and Lee (2010) 
illiteracy term (L) 106 4.472 6.399 0.100 34.300 Barro and Lee (2010) 
illiteracy term (P) 115 4.556 6.629 0.100 34.300 Barro and Lee (2010) 
left (L)  106 0.302 0.461 0 1 Armingeon, K., et. al. (2008). 
Comparative Political Data Set 
I (CPD I) 
left (P)  115 0.304 0.462 0 1 CPD I 
centre (L) 106 0.321 0.469 0 1 CPD I 
centre (P) 115 0.322 0.469 0 1 CPD I 
fragmentation (L) 106 0.113 0.318 0 1 CPD I 
fragmentation (P) 115 0.096 0.295 0 1 CPD I 
fragmentation (L) 106 0.321 0.469 0 1 CPD I 
fragmentation (P) 115 0.322 0.469 0 1 CPD I 
coalition (L)  106 0.500 0.502 0 1 CPD I 
coalition (P)  115 0.470 0.501 0 1 CPD I 
EU (L) 106 0.142 0.350 0 1 Wikipedia 
EU (P) 115 0.139 0.348 0 1 Wikipedia 
Notes: L UHIHUVWROHDGHU¶VWHUPLQRIILFHL adjusted UHIHUVWRWKHDGMXVWHGGHILQLWLRQZHDSSO\LQVHFWLRQWRIROORZOHDGHU¶VWHUPLQRIILFHDQGP 
UHIHUVWRWKHDGMXVWHGGHILQLWLRQZHDSSO\LQVHFWLRQWRIROORZDSDUW\¶VWHUPLQRIILFH 
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Appendix B. Pairwise correlation Matrix 
N=106 capital 
term 
capital 
deviation 
capital 
non-
election 
composition 
term 
composition 
deviation 
composition 
non-election 
surplus 
term 
surplus 
deviation 
surplus non-
election 
revenues 
term 
revenues 
deviation 
revenues 
non-election 
growth 
term 
inflation 
term 
unemployment 
term 
coalition new 
democracy 
illiteracy 
term 
left centre fragmentation EU 
capital term 1.00                      
capital deviation 0.10 1.00                     
capital non-election 1.00 0.02 1.00                    
composition term 0.77 0.16 0.77 1.00                   
composition deviation 0.03 0.79 -0.04 -0.04 1.00                  
composition non-election 0.77 0.11 0.76 1.00 -0.11 1.00                 
surplus term -0.33 -0.08 -0.32 -0.14 -0.07 -0.13 1.00                
surplus deviation -0.13 -0.22 -0.11 -0.16 0.11 -0.17 0.04 1.00               
surplus non-election -0.30 -0.04 -0.30 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 0.98 -0.15 1.00              
revenues term 0.33 -0.12 0.34 -0.20 0.03 -0.20 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00             
revenues deviation 0.04 0.25 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.35 -0.07 -0.04 1.00            
revenues non-election 0.32 -0.14 0.33 -0.21 0.03 -0.21 0.01 0.05 0.01 1.00 -0.10 1.00           
growth term 0.03 -0.15 0.05 0.14 -0.04 0.14 0.26 0.33 0.18 -0.11 0.11 -0.11 1.00          
inflation term 0.35 0.29 0.32 0.44 0.06 0.44 -0.39 -0.25 -0.33 -0.22 0.17 -0.23 -0.17 1.00         
unemployment term -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 -0.25 0.05 -0.25 -0.33 0.17 -0.36 -0.01 -0.12 -0.01 -0.02 -0.18 1.00        
coalition 0.16 -0.11 0.16 0.00 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.37 0.08 0.36 0.01 -0.22 -0.10 1.00       
new democracy 0.39 0.15 0.38 0.36 0.02 0.36 -0.32 -0.17 -0.27 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.09 0.50 0.18 -0.21 1.00      
illiteracy term 0.32 0.10 0.32 0.28 0.02 0.28 -0.28 -0.03 -0.27 -0.06 0.15 -0.06 -0.04 0.37 0.43 -0.22 0.69 1.00     
left -0.07 0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.45 0.12 0.09 1.00    
centre 0.13 -0.08 0.13 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.14 0.13 -0.16 0.18 0.00 0.18 0.04 -0.16 0.03 0.40 -0.12 -0.06 -0.45 1.00   
fragmentation -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 0.05 -0.19 0.09 0.20 0.00 0.20 -0.07 0.06 -0.03 0.30 0.01 -0.02 -0.23 -0.25 1.00  
EU 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.11 -0.04 -0.05 0.25 -0.10 0.10 -0.06 0.10 -0.04 -0.24 0.31 0.08 -0.12 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.03 1.00 
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Table 1. The effect of public investment and other determinants on the probability of re-election 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
fiscal variable: capital capital composition composition 
growth term 0.050 0.001 0.052 0.012 
 
(0.050) (0.064) (0.050) (0.061) 
 
    
inflation term -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.063*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
 
    
unemployment term -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 
 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) 
 
    
new democracy (0/1) 0.291* 0.304 0.324** 0.364** 
 
(0.148) (0.191) (0.140) (0.162) 
 
    
illiteracy term 0.020* 0.019 0.020* 0.021 
 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
 
    
left (0/1) 0.068 0.098 0.059 0.087 
 
(0.141) (0.153) (0.142) (0.153) 
 
    
centre (0/1) -0.200 -0.177 -0.196 -0.182 
 
(0.136) (0.136) (0.137) (0.136) 
 
    
fragmentation (0/1) -0.487*** -0.439*** -0.486*** -0.434*** 
 
(0.094) (0.122) (0.092) (0.112) 
 
    
coalition (0/1) -0.027 -0.076 -0.035 -0.080 
 
(0.174) (0.182) (0.177) (0.188) 
 
    
EU (0/1) -0.385*** -0.486*** -0.389*** -0.484*** 
 
(0.147) (0.123) (0.147) (0.118) 
 
    
fiscal variable term1 0.076 - 0.019 - 
 
(0.051)  (0.016)  
 
    
surplus term 0.026* - 0.021 - 
 
(0.016)  (0.016)  
 
    
revenues term 0.001 - 0.007 - 
 
(0.007)  (0.006)  
 
    
fiscal variable deviation2 - -0.151 - -0.045 
 
 (0.271)  (0.082) 
 
    
fiscal variable non-election3 - 0.138*** - 0.030* 
 
 (0.055)  (0.017) 
 
    
surplus deviation - 0.077* - 0.075** 
 
 (0.045)  (0.037) 
 
    
surplus non-election - 0.039** - 0.026 
 
 (0.018)  (0.018) 
 
    
revenues deviation - -0.001 - -0.003 
 
 (0.047)  (0.037) 
 
    
revenues non-election - -0.003 - 0.008 
 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
N 106 106 106 106 
pseudo R2 0.253 0.294 0.251 0.286 
Log likelihood -54.524 -51.515 -54.699 -52.116 
L-R test (p-value) 0.31 0.41 0.28 0.32 
Corrected predications (%)  73.58 78.30 74.53 78.30 
Notes: Logit estimate coefficients for continuous variable are marginal probability effects computed at sample means. For dummy variables, 
indicated by (0/1), the marginal effect shows the change in the dependent variable when the value of the dummy variable changes from 0 to 
1. In parentheses we report standard errors that are robust to both heteroskedasticity and possible autocorrelation within countries. *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
1 fiscal variable term: the average of the fiscal variable (% of GDP) during WKHOHDGHU¶VFXUUHQWWHrm in office (excluding the election year 
of previous elections, but including the election year of current elections). 
2
 fiscal variable deviation: the change in the fiscal variable (% of GDP) in the election year relative to the average of the previous years of 
the term (excluding the election year of previous elections). 
3 fiscal variable non-election: the average of the fiscal variable (% of GDP) GXULQJWKHOHDGHU¶VWHUPLQ office preceding the election year 
(excluding the election year of previous elections).  
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Table 2. Election year effects on the probability of re-election 
 (1) (2) 
growth  0.023 0.025 
 
(0.022) (0.022) 
 
  
inflation  -0.044** -0.044** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) 
 
  
unemployment  -0.006 -0.006 
 
(0.019) (0.019) 
 
  
new democracy (0/1) 0.289** 0.323** 
 
(0.136) (0.139) 
 
  
illiteracy  0.020* 0.021 
 
(0.012) (0.014) 
 
  
left (0/1) 0.128 0.122 
 
(0.122) (0.120) 
 
  
centre (0/1) -0.139 -0.135 
 
(0.149) (0.152) 
 
  
fragmentation (0/1) -0.491*** -0.491*** 
 
(0.109) (0.102) 
 
  
coalition (0/1) -0.003 -0.005 
 
(0.191) (0.194) 
 
  
EU (0/1) -0.409*** -0.409*** 
 
(0.149) (0.151) 
 
  
capital 0.073 - 
 
(0.060)  
 
  
composition - 0.016 
 
 (0.017) 
 
  
surplus  0.047*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.014) (0.012) 
 
  
revenues  0.003 0.008 
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
N 106 106 
pseudo R2 0.255 0.251 
Log likelihood -54.363 -54.648 
L-R test (p-value) 0.28 0.26 
Corrected predications (%)  77.36 77.36 
Notes: All variables are measured as the value in the last year of the term, the election year. Logit estimate coefficients for continuous 
variable are marginal probability effects computed at sample mean. For dummy variables, indicated by (0/1), the marginal effect shows the 
change in the dependent variable when the value of the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. In parentheses we report standard errors that 
are robust to both heteroskedasticity and possible autocorrelation within countries. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes 
significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 3. The effect of public investment and other determinants on the probability of re-election: Robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
fiscal variable: capital composition Capital Composition capital composition capital composition capital composition  
 Fixed effects Predetermined election Adjusted specification Party re-election Single party incumbents  
            
fiscal variable deviation1 0.700 0.301 0.168 0.033 -0.074 -0.029 0.067 -0.001 -0.108 0.011  
 (1.528) (0.743) (0.244) (0.087) (0.228) (0.065) (0.260) (0.073) (0.321) (0.086)  
 
          
 
fiscal variable non-election2 2.141*** 0.603* 0.119* 0.037 0.124** 0.027* 0.117** 0.036** 0.208** 0.042**  
 (0.772) (0.370) (0.074) (0.025) (0.057) (0.016) (0.050) (0.015) (0.085) (0.017)  
 
          
 
surplus deviation 0.630** 0.486* 0.018 0.012 0.059 0.056* 0.055 0.048* 0.023 -0.008  
 (0.303) (0.261) (0.040) (0.034) (0.040) (0.033) (0.038) (0.028) (0.046) (0.038)  
 
          
 
surplus non-election 0.317*** 0.145 0.005 0.006 0.030 0.020 -0.006 -0.013 0.031 0.007  
 (0.116) (0.139) (0.024) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024)  
 
          
 
revenues deviation 
-0.421 -0.214 -0.032 -0.014 0.015 0.014 -0.064 -0.053 0.047 0.064  
 (0.355) (0.321) (0.057) (0.050) (0.038) (0.029) (0.052) (0.043) (0.049) (0.040)  
 
          
 
revenues non-election 0.145 0.302 0.002 0.010 -0.001 0.008 -0.009 -0.000 -0.006 0.008  
 (0.135) (0.224) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)  
N 98 98 62 62 100 100 115 115 52 52  
pseudo R2 0.493 0.500 0.297 0.292 0.276 0.270 0.305 0.307 0.271 0.249  
Log likelihood -19.624 -19.348 -30.177 -30.386 -49.960 -50.369 -53.169 -53.004 -25.248 -26.012  
L-R test (p-value) - - 0.99 0.99 0.48 0.41 0.20 0.21 0.99 0.99  
Corrected predications (%)  
- - 75.81 75.81 75.00 77.00 82.61 83.48 78.85 78.85  
Notes: Also included in every specification, but not reported: growth term, inflation term, unemployment term, new democracy, illiteracy term, left, centre, fragmentation, coalition, EU. In columns (1) and (2) we 
report logit coefficients. In columns (3) to (10) logit estimate coefficients are marginal probability effects computed at sample means. In parentheses we report standard errors that are robust to both heteroskedasticity 
and possible autocorrelation within countries. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
1
 fiscal variable deviation: the change in the fiscal variable in the election year relative to the average of the previous years of the term (excluding the election year of previous elections). We adjust our calculations, 
when necessary, in columns (5)-(6) in order to adjust for the timing of elections as specified in section 3.3, and in columns (7)-(8) in order to follow the terms of parties as specified in section 3.4. 
2 fiscal variable non-election: the average in the fiscal variable GXULQJ WKH OHDGHU¶V WHUP LQoffice preceding the election year (excluding the election year of previous elections). We adjust our calculations, when 
necessary, in columns (5)-(6) in order to adjust for the timing of elections as specified in section 3.3, and in columns (7)-(8) in order to follow the terms of parties as specified in section 3.4. 
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Table 4. The effect of public investment and other determinants on the vote share of the incumbent 
 Vote share of party (parties) in government Vote share of the main government party 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
fiscal variable: capital composition capital composition capital composition capital composition 
vote sharet-1 0.542*** 0.547*** 0.361*** 0.360*** 0.511*** 0.529*** 0.328 0.340* 
 (0.081) (0.083) (0.115) (0.114) (0.108) (0.107) (0.204) (0.196) 
         
growth term 0.662 0.689 1.808*** 1.796*** 0.695* 0.736* 1.192* 1.108* 
 
(0.475) (0.469) (0.537) (0.532) (0.415) (0.426) (0.574) (0.552) 
 
  
 
     
inflation term -0.187 -0.190 0.357** 0.366** -0.227* -0.218* 0.020 0.022 
 
(0.140) (0.138) (0.169) (0.184) (0.118) (0.119) (0.158) (0.156) 
 
  
 
     
unemployment term -0.264 -0.247 0.337 0.321 -0.313*** -0.302** 0.059 0.003 
 
(0.174) (0.185) (0.253) (0.253) (0.108) (0.122) (0.284) (0.283) 
 
  
 
     
new democracy (0/1) -0.066*** -0.063*** 
-0.080** -0.079** -0.081*** -0.077*** -0.090** -0.081* 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.036) (0.033) (0.018) (0.021) (0.043) (0.044) 
 
  
 
     
illiteracy term 0.274** 0.276** 0.262 0.255 0.349*** 0.353*** 0.364 0.314 
 
(0.119) (0.121) (0.366) (0.334) (0.085) (0.085) (0.371) (0.365) 
 
  
 
     
left (0/1) 0.027* 0.026* 0.011 0.010 0.029* 0.028* 0.028 0.027 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.026) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.024) 
 
  
 
     
centre (0/1) 0.018* 0.019* 0.006 0.006 -0.012 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.028) (0.029) (0.014) (0.014) (0.035) (0.037) 
 
  
 
     
fragmentation (0/1) 0.024* 0.023 0.032 0.031 -0.022 -0.022 -0.014 -0.015 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.050) (0.049) 
 
  
 
     
coalition (0/1) 0.034** 0.032** 0.029 0.027 -0.018 -0.018 -0.038* -0.041** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.0180 
 
  
 
     
EU (0/1) -0.048** -0.048** 
-0.045* -0.047* -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.041* -0.046* 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) 
 
  
 
     
fiscal variable deviation1 0.593 0.151 
-0.548 -0.327 1.291 0.446 2.162 0.468 
 
(1.071) (0.394) (1.713) (0.720) (1.029) (0.388) (1.708) (0.706) 
 
  
 
     
fiscal variable non-election2 1.163** 0.303* 0.201 -0.134 1.123*** 0.258* 1.608** 0.069 
 
(0.465) (0.161) (0.940) (0.340) (0.432) (0.143) (0.732) (0.311) 
 
  
 
     
surplus deviation 0.117 0.059 0.116 0.152 0.470** 0.356* 0.477* 0.352 
 
(0.187) (0.190) (0.297) (0.305) (0.194) (0.203) (0.267) (0.291) 
 
  
 
     
surplus non-election -0.087 -0.158 
-0.034 -0.015 -0.220 -0.286** -0.034 -0.079 
 
(0.169) (0.163) (0.2380 (0.252) (0.144) (0.140) (0.280) (0.273) 
 
  
 
     
revenues deviation -0.078 -0.030 0.219 0.234 -0.358 -0.256 -0.241 0.047 
 
(0.357) (0.315) (0.527) (0.468) (0.231) (0.224) (0.374) (0.290) 
 
  
 
     
revenues non-election -0.077 0.015 0.235 0.214 -0.163** -0.075 -0.177 -0.119 
 
(0.064) (0.075) (0.213) (0.166) (0.076) (0.088) (0.201) (0.199) 
N 106 106 106 106 104 104 104 104 
R2 - - 0.417 0.418 - - 0.563 0.552 
Notes: Fractional logit estimator implemented through Bernoulli Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimation in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6). Logistic Transformation 
of the dependent variable and including country Fixed Effects in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8).  Estimated coefficients for continuous variable are marginal effects 
computed at sample mean. For dummy variables, indicated by (0/1), the marginal effect shows the change in the dependent variable when the value of the 
dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. In parenthesis we report standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and within country correlation *** denotes 
significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
1
 fiscal variable deviation: the change in the fiscal variable in the election year relative to the average of the previous years of the term (excluding the election 
year of previous elections). 
2 fiscal variable non-election: WKHDYHUDJHLQWKHILVFDOYDULDEOHGXULQJWKHOHDGHU¶VWHUPin the office preceding the election year (excluding the election year of 
previous elections).  
 
 
